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NOTES AND COMMENTS
dence that plaintiff's stenographer, at her desk in adjoining room, saw
a woman sitting in plaintiff's lap. Plaintiff offered as evidence an
experiment to show that from where she was sitting the stenographer
could not have seen him. Held, Inadmissible, since it was not proved
that the furniture was in the same position as at the time of the
event.1 9 In an action for the wrongful death of a child in a railroad
accident, plaintiff offered an experiment in evidence to show that
defendant's engineer, when he saw an object upon the track, should
have recognized it as a child from a point distant 1,200 feet. Held,
Admissible, because, in the experiment, it was shown that the circumstances upon which the evidence was predicated could be substantially reproduced, since it was proved that the engineer actually
saw the child on the track.20
In the principal case, the necessary foundation for the experiment could not be laid and, therefore, the ruling in the case was
correct.
CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR.

Landlord and Tenant-Effect of Consent to One Assignment of
Lease on Condition Not to Assign-Dumpor's Case.
A 1931 opinion 1 of the Supreme Court has ushered onto the
2
North Carolina juristic stage the English case of Dumpor v. SymnW
decided in 1603. In Dumpor's Case a condition that the lessee and
his assigns would not convey the lease without special license from
the lessor was held to have been extinguished, when one such license
was given. This holding is obviously contrary to a common sense
interpretation of the given transaction. The court based its decision.
on precedent, but it has been shown that the authorities were invoked
by false analogy.3 Dumpor's Case is no longer the law in England,4
but its doctrine continues to prevail in several American jurisdictions.5
"Kuenk v. Klenk, supra note 16.
Henderson v. R. R., supra note 4.
'Childs v. Warner Bros. Southern Theatres, Inc., 200 N. C. 333, 156 S. E.
923 (1931).
24 Coke 119 (1603).
'Dumpor's Case (1873) 7 AM. L. Rnv. 616, 623.
' The following statutes nullified the rule in Dumpor's case: 22 and 23

Vicr. c. 35, §1 (1859) and 23 and 24 Vicr. c. 38, 6 (1860).
'Reid v. Weissner & Sons Brewing Co., 88 Md. 234, 40 Atl. 877 (1898);

Pennock v. Lyons, 118 Mass. 92 (1875) ; Aste v. Putnam Hotel Co., 247 Mass.

147, 141 N. E. 666 (1923) ; Murray v. Harvey, 56 N. Y. 337 (1874) ; see German Am. Savings Bank v. Gollmer, 155 Cal. 683, 102 Pac. 932, 934 (1909).
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Judicial discussions6 of the rule in Dumpor's Case have questioned its soundness; legal writers have vigorously criticised it;7 no

case has been found to approve it on principle; and its application
has been narrowly restricted.8 The following variations from the
facts in Dumpor's Case have been held sufficient to prevent the operation of the doctrine it expresses: (1) a covenant instead of a condition, 9 (2) a waiver instead of a license, 10 or (3) a condition against
subletting instead of a condition against assigning." These distinctions, so far as their purpose is concerned, are without substance
and the cases that rely on them, while not expressly contrary to
12
Dumpor's Case, in effect repudiate it.
Childs v. Warner Bros. Southern Theatres, Inc.,'3 suggests the
question of whether Dumpors Case will be followed in North Carolina. There the Berkley Co. leased a theatre building to Craver, the
lease containing conditions that the lessee and his assigns 14 would
pay the rent and would not assign without the consent'8 of the lessor.
'Doe v. Bliss, 4 Taunt, 735, 736 (1813) (Mansfield: "Certainly the profession have always wondered at Dumpor's case."); Moss v. Chappell, 126
Ga. 196, 54 S. E. 968, 973 (1900) ["The doctrine (in Dumpor's case) seems to
us to be purely artificial and not founded on any sound reason."].
"1 WASHBURN, REAL PaoPERTY (4th ed. 1876) 472 n. ("Dumpor's case has
always been, it is believed, a stumbling block in the way of the profession.") ;
Jjumpor's Case, supra note 3; Bronaugh, Consent to Assignment of LeaseDumpor's Case (1924) 30 W. VA. L. Q. 277; Note (1925) 1 WASH. L. REV. 52.
'Dumpor's Case, supra note 3, at 632; North Chicago Street R. R. Co. v.
App. 435 (1900) (where a lease contains a renewal
Le Grand Co., 95 Ill.
clause, if the rule in Dumpor's case dispenses with the condition, it doe& so
only for the instant term).
'Paul v. Nurse, 8 Barn. & C. 486 (1828); Dakin v. Williams, 17 Wend.
(N. Y.) 447 (1837). The difference between a covenant and a condition is
that for breach of covenant the lessor can only bring an action for damages,
while for breach of condition the lessor may reEnter.
" Doe v. Bliss, mpra note 6; Wertheimer v. Hosmer, 83 Mich. 56, 47 N. W.
47 (1890) (oral license amounted to a waiver). The difference between a
license and a waiver is that license is consent before and waiver is consent
after assignment.
" Fischer v. Ginzburg, 191 App. Div. 418, 181 N. Y. Supp. 516 (1920) ; see
Doe v. Pritchard, 5 B. & Ad. 765, 781 (1833).
'A thorough elaboration of this point is contained in Investors' Guarantee
Corporation v. Thompson, 31 Wyo. 264, 225 Pac. 590, 594 (1924).
" 200 N. C. 333, 156 S.E. 923 (1931).
" Where the lessee only is mentioned in the condition, he is bound personally and a license extinguishes the condition without the aid of the rule in
Dumpor's case. Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291,
112 S.E. 512 (1922) (Dumpoes case recognized as the law, but held not to
apply to "single" condition).
An ingenious distinction is made between an oral and a written license in
order to avoid the rule in Dumpor's case in Wertheimer v. Hosmer, supra
note 10.
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The Berkley Co. conveyed the reversion 16 to the plaintiff who consented to an assignment to the defendant. The defendant reassigned
the lease to Carolina Theatres, and in response to a notice of the
reassignment the plaintiff wrote the defendant, "I shall continue to
recognize you as lessee of the property ... and expect you to see that
the payments (of rent) are made promptly and in accordance with
the lease." A default in the payment of rent was made by Carolina
Theatres for which the plaintiff sued the defendant. Judgment for
the plaintiff below was affirmed on appeal.
The opinion of the court is largely devoted to a review of Dumpors Case, but it does not clearly appear whether the rule in Dumpor's
Case was involved in the decision. The lessor in the Childs Case
was held entitled to recover from an assignee rent which accrued
subsequent to a reassignment. The liability of an assignee to pay
rent is generally said to be based on privity of estate and to cease
when he transfers the lease. 17 The liability of a lessee to pay rent,
-however, is based also on privity of contract, which is not affected by
an assignment.18 It follows that the conclusion reached in the Childs
Case must rest on one of two theories: either (1) that the defendant
was under some contractual liability to pay rent, or (2) that there
was no valid reassignment.
An assignee becomes contractually liable for rent only on some
undertaking over and above the act of assignment. 19 The facts in
the Childs Case disclose no such undertaking by the defendant, but
the plaintiff writes, "I shall continue to recognize you (the defend"A grantee of the reversion may enforce the conditions in a lease. Investors' Guarantee Corporation v. Thompson, supra note 12.
" Paul v. Nurse, supra note 9 (reassignment in violation of covenant);
Voigt v. Resor, 80 Ill. 331 (1875); Consolidated Coal Co. v. Peers, 166 Ili.
361, 40 N. E. 1105 (1896); Reid v. Weissner & Sons Brewing Co., supra note
5 (facts similar to those in the instant case) ; Mason v. Smith, 131 Mass. 510
(1881) (reassignment without knowledge of the lessor); Durand v. Curtis,
57 N. Y. 7 (1874); Tibbals v. Iffland, 10 Wash. 451, 39 Pac. 102 (1895)
(reassignment without notice to the lessor). But see Krider v. Ramsay, 79
N. C. 354, 357 (1878).
" Keith v. McGregor, 163 Ark. 203, 259 S. W. 725 (1924) (lessor's acceptance of note from assignee for rent past due relieved lessor of his responsibility for that amount) ; McKeon v. Wendelken, 25 Misc. 711, 55 N. Y. Supp.
625 (1899) (lessee recovered from assignee amount of rent the lessee paid the
lessor); Gusman v. Mathews, 29 Ohio App. 402, 163 N. E. 636 (1928) (99
year lease) ; Spitz v. Nunn, 34 Ohio App. 379, 171 N. E. 117 (1930) (sureties
for lessee's payment of the rent not discharged by an assignment) ; see Alexander v. Harkins, 120 N. C. 452, 454, 27 S. E. 120. 121 (1897).
" Consumers Ice Co. v. Bixler', 84 Md. 437, 35 Atl. 1086 (1896) (assignee
agreed that all the covenants of the lease should be binding between himself
and the lessor).
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ant) as lessee." The court intimates2 0 that it considered the defendant under a contractual duty to pay rent and cites an early North
Carolina case 2 l embodying a dictum 22 to the effect that an assignee
is ordinarily bound contractually for rent. If the decision is based
on this theory, there was no occasion for the court to pass on the
rule in Dumpor's Case, for the defendant was liable for the rent regardless of the reassignment.
If the defendant was under no contractual duty to pay rent, he
would have been bound to do so only in case the reassignment was
invalid.P No grounds of invalidity appear, except a violation of the
condition not to assign without the lessor's consent. The application
of the rule in Dumpo's Case in the Childs Case situation would have
"wiped out" the condition before the reassignment. The judgment
for the plaintiff, therefore, would entail the existence of the condition
and a repudiation of the rule in Dumpor's Case.
If the defendant was under no contractual liability to pay rent,
the North Carolina court has refused to perpetuate a "venerable
error," and has placed a "reasonable construction" on a condition
that the lessee and his assigns will not assign the lease. If the defendant was under contractual liability to pay rent, the language2 4 of the
court is strongly prophetic that the court will refuse to follow Dumpors Ccae when a proper case is presented.
W. T. COVINGTON, JR.
Master and Servant-Ratification of Tort by
Failure to Discharge.
Plaintiff passenger sues defendant railroad for alleged assault on
her by a Pullman porter while she was reclining in her berth. Held,
".. the lessee and his assigns agreed to pay the rent. ... The covenant to
pay rent is continuous in its nature, and such covenant is binding by express
provision upon the assigns of the lessee ...." This view, however, is in conflict with the authorities cited in note 17 supra, and would make every assignee
of the lease, for whatever length of time, responsible for the rent for the rest
of the term.
' Krider v. Ramsay, supra note 17, at 357.
" "The privity of estate and privity of contract still subsist between the
lessor and the assignee, as it did between the lessor and lessee."
" Cases cited in note 17 supra.
' Brogden, J.: ". .. a reasonable construction of the lease .. . leads to the
conclusion that the restriction against assigning . . . operated upon . . . the
assigns of the lessee as well as himself" and ."one assignment did not waive
the conditions of the lease" so that "thereafter any subsequent assignee could
turn the (lessor's) property over to the use and occupancy of any undesirable
and irresponsible person without his approval."

